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A B S T R A C T
Advocacy for people using health and social care services is widely promoted but its theoretical foundation is
under-developed and its impact poorly conceptualised. This paper explores the liberatory potential of in-
dependent advocacy, using Fricker's concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ as a framework. People experiencing mental
distress are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustices as a consequence of deeply embedded social stigma
resulting in a priori assumptions of irrationality and unreliability such that their knowledge is often discounted or
downgraded. The mental health service user/survivor movement is at the forefront of validating personal ex-
perience and narrative to secure a diﬀerent ontological and epistemological basis for mental distress. A foun-
dational strand of this is advocacy to enable people to give voice to their experience.
The case of independent mental health advocacy (IMHA) services under mental health legislation in England,
provides an opportunity to critically examine whether advocacy can promote epistemic justice as a result of the
legally sanctioned encounter between clinical assessment and subjective experience, pivoting on judgements
about risk. This paper draws on empirical data from a national evaluation of IMHA services, which included 90
individual interviews with people subject to detention and three focus groups with mental health service users.
Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice is used as a lens to investigate how this type of advocacy might mitigate
forms of epistemic injustice, and thereby promote greater social justice in mental health.
The concept of epistemic injustice provides a valuable theoretical basis for understanding the worth of ad-
vocacy in addressing testimonial injustice as well as its relative weakness in overcoming hermeneutical injustice.
The challenge of independent advocacy to the dominant discourse within mental health is considered and
questions raised about the place of advocacy in modern democratic mental health systems.
1. Introduction
In mental health services, power asymmetries are particularly stark
with the existence of legislation permitting involuntary hospitalisation
and treatment. Because of this, people experiencing mental distress can
ﬁnd their encounter with mental health professionals profoundly dis-
abling: muting their experience, compounding isolation and exclusion,
and perpetuating stigma and social disadvantage. Sharing experience,
survivor activism, and advocacy to promote diﬀerent understandings of
mental distress have been central to mobilising against psychiatric
hegemony (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2017).
In this paper we focus on independent advocacy, which is often
framed as a liberatory practice. Advocacy aims to enable people to have
a voice, to express their needs and wishes and protect their rights
(Henderson and Pochin, 2001; World Health Organization (WHO),
2005). It creates a space for diﬀerent forms of knowledge within an
unequal power dynamic that privileges professionals' authority over
that of lived experience (Code, 2006; Molas, 2016). Although appre-
ciated for contributing to greater democratic sensibility in mental
health, the theoretical foundations for individual advocacy are under-
developed and how to evaluate its impact poorly conceptualised. The
aim of this paper is to investigate advocacy in theorising around epis-
temic justice. Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice (2006) is used to
analyse people's direct accounts of independent mental health advocacy
(IMHA) in England. IMHA provides a critical case of advocacy, a type of
statutory advocacy introduced for people subject to compulsion under
mental health legislation, and where the power asymmetries are par-
ticularly glaring.
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2. Background
2.1. Power asymmetries in mental health
For centuries, the social position of and care and support for people
experiencing mental distress has been found wanting, often attributed
to stigma and the resulting low priority aﬀorded to mental health.
Globally, this is often framed as inadequate resourcing of mental health
care (Becker and Kleinman, 2013) resulting in a reliance on outdated
and institutionalised models of care, even in well-resourced countries,
and social marginalisation exempliﬁed by prison occupancy and
homelessness (Care Quality Commission, 2017; Insert United Nations
before (UN), 2017). The UN identiﬁes three reasons for the lack of
progress: (1) the dominance of the biomedical model and the ‘arbitrary
assumption that biomedical interventions are more eﬀective than psy-
chosocial approaches (UN, 2017: 6); (2) power asymmetries between
mental health professionals - notably psychiatrists - and service users,
reinforcing paternalism and patriarchy; and (3) a biomedical bias in the
use of evidence in mental health reﬂecting the power asymmetries. At
the heart of this critique are epistemic questions about what knowledge
counts and whose knowledge matters.
2.2. Epistemic injustice
In theorising about the relationship between social power and our
understandings of social experiences, Fricker (2006) describes how
epistemic injustice prevents some groups from contesting distorted
understandings of their social experiences (Fricker, 2006). In Fricker's
terms, epistemic injustice occurs when a person is “wronged speciﬁcally
in her capacity as a knower” (2007: 18). Epistemic injustice is founda-
tional to other forms of social injustice because the capacity as a giver
of knowledge is intrinsic to human value (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).
Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial
and hermeneutical. Testimonial injustices arise when an individual's
word is aﬀorded less credibility or invalidated through discounting or
diminishing their account, creating a credibility deﬁcit. Fricker con-
tends that this reﬂects prejudice based on negative stereotypes asso-
ciated with a particular social identity, and thus identity-prejudicial
credibility deﬁcit becomes the paradigm case for testimonial injustice
(Faulkner, 2012; LeBlanc and Kinsella, 2016). Thus, the person is
wronged not only for the testimonial injustice but because it diminishes
them as a person: the ‘core epistemic insult’ (Fricker, 2007: 44). Her-
meneutical injustice refers to the cognitive disadvantage when trying to
make sense of social experience as a consequence of gaps in our col-
lective understanding (Fricker, 2006). This arises when there is a lack of
conceptual resources for understanding experience (Hookway, 2010),
inﬂuenced by dominant social norms and values privileging particular
types of knowledge.
Epistemic injustices also arise when people are denied the oppor-
tunity to participate as epistemic agents because they are treated as a
‘non-knower’ (Hookway, 2010). Silencing, or ‘epistemic violence’, is pre-
dicated on communication as reciprocal exchanges and occurs when the
hearer fails to recognise the vulnerabilities of the speaker (Dotson,
2011). This failure is profoundly inﬂuenced by structural barriers and
social norms impeding participation or ignorance impeding recognition
of epistemic agency.
Whilst people who are ill are vulnerable to epistemic injustice (Carel
and Kidd, 2014), those experiencing mental distress are particularly so.
This is a consequence of social inequalities:; historic marginalisation
and social stigma associating forms of mental distress with possession
by the devil or spirits, moral inﬁrmity and moral depravity (Crichton
et al., 2016). The culturally embedded relationship between madness
and non-reason allied with an assumption of moral failure (Porter,
1987; Scull, 1979) persists in concepts of incomprehensibility, personal
responsibility and deviancy. Over the centuries, this has served to
sanction paternalism, exclusion from decision-making and enforce
agential limitations increasingly fostered by socially sanctioned pro-
fessional power (Foucault, 2006).
The mental health survivor movement has long identiﬁed the as-
saults on the credibility and validity of their experience as a con-
sequence of psychiatric power (Plumb, 1993). ‘Sanism’, i.e. the irra-
tional stereotyping and prejudice associated with mental ill-health
(Perlin, 2013) has been identiﬁed as more deleterious than the condi-
tions themselves (Thornicroft et al., 2016). Common stereotypes foster
negative perceptions that people experiencing mental distress are “de-
lusional, emotionally unstable, unpredictable, untruthful, untrustworthy,
lacking all capacity for ‘rational’ thought and invariably dangerous to
oneself or others” (LeBlanc and Kinsella, 2016; 64). At an individual
level, the encounter between people experiencing mental distress and
mental health services relies almost exclusively on narrative and the
interpretation of subjective knowledge (Sanati and Kyratsous, 2015). A
priori assumptions of irrationality and cognitive deﬁcits are often made,
particularly for people experiencing psychotic symptoms, thus ren-
dering assessments liable to grave epistemic errors (Sanati and
Kyratsous, 2015; Molas, 2016).
The testimony of people experiencing mental distress is, therefore,
at high risk of being viewed as irrelevant or unreliable and, therefore,
ignored, downgraded, or rejected. Thus, justifying their exclusion from
decision-making about their lives and increasing the likelihood of
compulsion (Crichton et al., 2016; Sanati and Kyratsous, 2015;
Scrutton, 2017). The survivor literature provides extensive examples of
the consequential harms of epistemic injustices including isolation,
threats to personal identity, alienation and the perpetuation of stigma
(Lee, 2013). This includes exclusion as epistemic agents, and epistemic
violence when:
Diﬀerent forms of madness are constructed in particular ways and then
used to diminish and deny the legitimacy of the knower –that renders that
person out of existence, unable to be heard and to have their interests
count.
Liegghio:124).
The egregious impact of epistemic injustice in mental health is
particularly stark in relation to mental health legislation (Sanati and
Kyratsous, 2015). This also impacts adversely on the life chances of
people diagnosed with a mental illness in relation to increased mor-
tality (Thornicroft, 2011) and barriers to employment, housing, and
relationships. The dominance of a biopsychosocial model privileges
objectivity and third person accounts (Molas, 2016; Scrutton, 2017)
and locates mental distress in the individual rather than the product of
social relationships and context, described by LeBlanc and Kinsella
(2016) as pre-emptive silencing.
2.3. Addressing epistemic injustice
Potential remedies proposed to address epistemic injustice take two
forms. First are those from philosophy and medicine, which focus on
increasing epistemic humility and the capacity of the listener to hear in
order to develop greater awareness of potential epistemic injustice in
the care professional and service user relationship. Carel and Kidd
(2014) describe a phenomenological toolkit and with Crichton et al.
(2016), promote ‘Schwartz Rounds’ in medical training and clinical
practice designed to raise awareness of the existential, ethical and
personal aspects of individual circumstances of service users. Second
are those from the perspective of epistemically marginalised groups,
which target empowerment and increasing the agency of people ex-
periencing mental distress. These focus on strengthening voice, re-
sisting the dominant discourse and neo-liberal politics of individualism,
and seeking to develop alternative understandings of the diverse ex-
periences of distress and strategies for support (LeBlanc and Kinsella,
2016). Mad Studies, emerging from survivor activism, foregrounds
political participation, peer support, a focus on recovery and various
forms of advocacy, and validates personal experience and narrative as a
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foundation for a diﬀerent ontological and epistemological basis for
mental distress (LeFrançois et al., 2013; Beresford and Russo, 2016).
2.4. The rise of advocacy to address power asymmetries
Advocacy as a movement gathered momentum in the UK in the mid-
1980s as a consequence of survivor activism promoting individual and
collective advocacy to situate and validate personal experience, and to
counter discrimination, coercion and rights infringements (Newbigging
et al., 2015a). Advocacy is fundamentally concerned with seeing the
world from the perspective of marginalised individuals and re-
presenting their voice (Henderson and Pochin, 2001). It serves to ad-
dress power asymmetries, protect rights and promote social justice
through greater empowerment and democratic participation of voices
that might otherwise be silenced (WHO, 2005; Code, 2006).
Advocacy is provided independently from the health and social care
sector and there are diﬀerent types of advocacy (Newbigging et al.,
2015a). In England, advocacy is typically provided by not-for-proﬁt or
community organisations. The introduction of IMHA in 2007, a statu-
tory form of advocacy, resulted from lobbying by the Mental Health
Alliance in the course of the prolonged and conﬂictual reform of the
1983 Mental Health (MH) Act (Newbigging et al., 2015a). The existence
of mental health legislation is highly contested and argued to constitute
a breach of human rights (Minkowitz, 2006; UN Human Rights Council,
2017)) and exemplify sanism (Perlin, 2013). In England, people are
subject to detention under the 1983MH Act if they are assessed as
‘suﬀering’ from a mental illness and it is necessary for their own health
and safety or the protection of other people (Mental Health Act, 1983).
The rates of compulsion continue to rise: people from Black, Asian and
Minority Ethnic communities (BAME) are over-represented and there
are enduring concerns about rights infringements not only in England
(CQC, 2018) but also across Europe (WHO, 2018). The purpose of
IMHA, therefore, is to protect the rights of people detained under the
1983Mental Health Act and to enable people to exercise those rights by
having a voice and supporting participation in decision-making. The
operation of advocacy in the context of compulsion provides a critical
exemplar of the epistemic encounter between clinical assessment and
subjective experience, pivoting on judgements about potential risk.
3. Study context
The data presented is drawn from a large-scale study of the im-
plementation and quality of IMHA services in England, using a mixed
methods design. Quantitative methods enabled examination of IMHA
provision and access, while qualitative methods supported investigation
of experiences of IMHA services from diﬀerent perspectives and the
factors inﬂuencing its quality (Newbigging et al., 2012, 2015b). The
study was in two stages, with the ﬁrst identifying dimensions and
benchmarks of quality and generating a framework of quality indicators
for IMHA, which were then explored empirically in eight sites at the
second stage. A case study approach was adopted to enable real-time
exploration of complex and dynamic phenomena (Yin, 2009). The case
study sites were purposively selected to reﬂect variations in delivery
contexts with regard to demography, organisational arrangements and
approaches to the provision of IMHA services. The sites covered inner
city, urban, rural, and coastal areas and included seven Mental Health
NHS Trusts, covering the full range of mental health services from
community services to high secure services, and one independent pro-
vider of low and medium secure services. The sites were located across
England: two in the North West, and one each in the North East, Mid-
lands, East of England, South West, South East, and London. In each
site, data were collected to explore the operation and experience of
IMHA services, including interviews with 214 participants (qualifying
patients, mental health professionals, and advocacy staﬀ).
4. Methodology
4.1. Study design
The element of the study concerned with the themes of this paper
was qualitative. It involved three focus groups with mental health
service users, including a speciﬁc BAME focus group in stage one, and
semi-structured qualitative interviews with 90 service users eligible for
IMHA services (i.e. ‘qualifying patients’) in stage two. Both methods
were used to maximise participation and ensure the richness of data so
that the analysis was grounded in complexity and detail (Emmel, 2013).
4.2. Research team
The research team involved a partnership between four academic
researchers, including the authors, and nine speciﬁcally recruited co-
researchers who were people with lived experience of mental distress,
including detention in acute inpatient settings and secure services. One
of the four academics also had recent experience of being detained
under the MH Act, two had a professional background in mental health
and across the team there was experience of commissioning and/or
providing diﬀerent forms of advocacy services as well as evaluation
expertise. Involvement of service users including recruitment, training
and support was consistent with national good practice (National in-
stitute for Health Research, 2009) and, apart from the initial study
design, co-researchers were involved in all aspects of the research
process and dissemination of the ﬁndings. A Service User Reference
Group, consisting of six people acted as a critical friend to the project
and also contributed to the design of the research tools and inter-
pretation of the ﬁndings. These two elements of involvement of people
with lived experience were critical to exploring the theme of epistemic
justice and ensuring the validity of the research though accessing
multiple interpretations, which reﬂected the diﬀerent values, experi-
ences, and social contexts of the team. This required us to reﬂect on
how power was shared between the academics and the researchers to
move towards a greater democratic sensibility in the research process.
4.3. Recruitment and sampling
Information about the research and the focus groups was promoted
on key service user websites and via local networks, with three com-
munity-based advocacy organisations also facilitating the recruitment
of service users, who had experience of detention under the
1983Mental Health Act.
The criteria for inclusion in the interviews was qualifying for sup-
port from IMHA services, as deﬁned by the 2007Mental Health
(Amendment) Act, and having the capacity to consent. Three methods
were used to recruit qualifying patients with the aim of ensuring di-
versity of participant characteristics across the sites, with more than
one method being used in three sites:
(a) Purposeful stratiﬁed sample (Sandelowski, 2000) of mental health
provider data of anonymised detentions of people qualifying for
IMHA services in the previous 12 months (ﬁve sites); and
(b) Via service user or BAME organisations (two sites)
(c) Via IMHA provider organisations (three sites)
Approximately 175 qualifying patients received information about
the study either by post or in person from a mental health or advocacy
service. Informal feedback indicates that those that declined to parti-
cipate either considered that they were not well enough or were no
longer detained and did not wish to revisit the experience. Ninety-two
people were recruited, with two people excluded because they were
lacking the capacity to consent to participate.
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4.4. Data collection methods
Focus groups with service users explored perceptions of, and per-
sonal experiences of IMHA services, as well as views on the dimensions
of quality for IMHA services. Face-to-face semi-structured qualitative
interviews used the lines of inquiry summarised in Fig. 1. In each site
between 8 and 15 qualifying patients were interviewed (mean=11) in
a variety of settings including acute inpatient (AIP) and secure facilities,
community-based mental health services and individuals' homes and
this included a small number of people on Community Treatment Or-
ders (CTOs). Interviews lasted 45minutes to 2 hours and were con-
ducted in English, via interpreters where necessary, and were recorded
with participants’ permission.. All participants were invited to complete
a brief questionnaire gathering information on demographic variables
and information about detention under the MH Act. Co-researchers co-
facilitated the focus groups and either led or were partnered with an
academic for the face to face interviews. The co-researchers often dis-
closed their service user identity and the questionnaire asked for views
on being interviewed by a service user. The responses to this method
were positive and in general facilitated rich accounts.
4.5. Ethical approval
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the Cambridgeshire 3
NHS Research Ethics Committee and the University of Central
Lancashire International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion
Ethics Committee. Research governance approvals were obtained for
each study site from NHS Mental Health Trusts.
4.6. Analysis
The focus group and interview data were transcribed and imported
into NVivo 10 for data management and to enable coding and com-
parisons between diﬀerent respondent types. The analytic process was
iterative and inclusive, designed to explore diﬀerences in interpreta-
tion. The development of the coding framework was initially driven by
the research objectives, beginning with the identiﬁcation of key themes
and patterns and open coding (Bazeley, 2013; Saldana, 2012). A two-
day workshop was held with all members of the team to reﬁne the
coding frame through engaging with the original data, review the
emergent themes, identify additional themes, and analyse the re-
lationships between the themes. The workshop started with reﬂecting
on individual personal experience and how this might inﬂuence us to
privilege particular accounts; throughout the workshop, team members
were challenged to justify their analysis with reference to the data. The
subsequent coding of transcripts involved seven team members, in-
cluding four co-researchers and a subsample of transcripts were coded
by an additional member of the research team for inter-rater reliability.
Having a voice emerged as a central ﬁnding, and this led to the
discovery in the literature of inter-related concepts concerned with
epistemic agency and epistemic injustice (i.e. testimonial injustice,
hermeneutic injustice; pre-emptive silencing and prejudicial-credibility
deﬁcits). These have been used by the current authors as sensitising
concepts (Blumer, 1954) to interrogate the impact of advocacy in
promoting epistemic justice. Sensitizing concepts serve as “points of
departure from which to organize, interpret, and extend previous re-
search ﬁndings” (Charmaz, 2000: 515) and link the particular with the
universal to facilitate the development of theoretical linkages and new
insights (Van den Hoonard, 1997).
5. Findings
Fifteen mental health service users participated in three focus
groups, including ﬁve people from BAME backgrounds; three people
unable to attend the focus groups were interviewed by telephone. A
further 90 people were interviewed across the case study sites, all of
whom had qualiﬁed to access IMHA services. The demographic ques-
tionnaire was completed by 91% of the interview sample and the results
demonstrating the variability in the characteristics illustrated in
Table 1.
The interview sample included 61 people who had used IMHA
services (IMHA partners) and 29 who qualiﬁed to use IMHA services
but had not used the service (qualifying patients), two thirds of whom
were unaware of the existence of IMHA services or uncertain whether
they had used them.
The ﬁndings are presented under three major domains: epistemic
agency; experiences of epistemic injustice; and the impact of advocacy
in promoting epistemic agency and addressing epistemic injustices.
Verbatim quotes have been selected purposefully with participant at-
tribution referring to IMHA use/non-use, and the participant's location.
5.1. Epistemic agency
The diﬃculties of ﬁnding one's voice in the midst of acute distress,
Fig. 1. Lines of inquiry for the qualitative interviews.
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and personal confusion regarding the process of detention, often in
unfamiliar surroundings, were evident. Participants reported feeling
fear, panic, anger, aggression, paranoia, worry, vulnerable and alone,
and for some detention ampliﬁed past experiences of compulsion and
limited epistemic agency. This was exempliﬁed by a woman who de-
scribed ongoing abuse and coercive control by her husband leading her
to make a serious suicide attempt triggering a police intervention,
where she was handcuﬀed and detained in a cell:
“It's a very traumatic experience on its own and I think that was more of
a trauma … in the end it actually displaced everything my husband
actually did to me”.
Qualifying patient (AIP)
Although a minority described the feeling of security that being
detained provided, the majority described it as disempowering, frigh-
tening and stigmatising, engendering a sense of criminality rather than
care and support:
“I felt like I was being punished, I felt like I'm ill, I'm trying to kill myself,
nobody else, and now I'm being punished, that's how it felt to me. It still
does actually.”
IMHA partner (Psychiatric Intensive Care (PICU) (Newbigging et al.,
2012)
Mental distress, the context for admission, and the experience of
compulsion impacted on epistemic agency and the capacity to process
information and the conﬁdence for self-expression. This was also in-
ﬂuenced by perceived social diﬀerences between participants and
professionals in relation to class and ethnic background.
The process and relational aspects of compulsion served to further
limit epistemic agency and impede the motivation to exercise their
rights. For some participants, this was as basic as not having access to
an interpreter and for others it was the cursory approach to providing
relevant information:
“I was just left with these bits of paper with names and addresses of
solicitors on and didn't know what to do with them, but at that point I
was too unwell to realise or to be able to speak up and say 'I'm not happy
with this'. I just kind of gave up at that point, I thought 'right well I'm
sectioned, I might as well just sit it' out’ and I didn't go for my appeal.”
IMHA partner, (AIP)
Participants described how professional power operated in ward
meetings with large numbers of professionals present there was a sense
that there was a hidden agenda and little scope to challenge the as-
sumptions that were being made about them. Observations were also
made about ward regimes, which limited opportunities for contact with
staﬀ:
“You might be banging your head oﬀ a brick wall. I'd say 'I want to see
the manager I'm not happy about this', 'The manager will see you in ten
minutes', the manager's too busy to see you, he'll see you tomorrow, or
he'll see you the next day..' so that's how it would go on, and on and on.”
BAME qualifying patient (AIP)
Incidents of abuse, coercion, and physical and pharmacological re-
straint were frequently referenced, often experienced as punishment
and clearly serving as a restraint on voice. This included dehumanising
practices, epitomised by a woman who described being assessed by two
psychiatrists whilst she was in the bath. Regimes and staﬀ behaviours
were interpreted by participants as expressions of professionals’ power,
reinforcing feelings of passivity and anger and undermining capacity
and conﬁdence to speak up.
5.2. Epistemic injustices
Accounts of testimonial injustice were common and participants
described how their experience, and by implication how they, had been
dismissed as irrelevant:
“I think a person should be able to speak for themselves … but the Doctor
doesn't always want to listen to you when you are on the mental health
section, they want to poo poo you out of the room.”
Qualifying patient (AIP)
In particular, pressing concerns pertaining to an individual's daily
life were ignored despite being relevant to the circumstances of ad-
mission. Concerns about housing, physical health, care and treatment
under the Mental Health Act, including incidents of abuse and com-
plaints also went unheeded:
“Getting shouted at, getting called a retard, getting, called a bastard by
staﬀ here. And nothing's ever done about it. Management just says ‘oh
away you go, you know, you're imagining things' but we're not stupid. We
may have mental health problems but we're deﬁnitely not stupid.”
IMHA partner (rehabilitation hostel)
Participants powerfully illustrated the prejudicial-credibility deﬁcit
described by Fricker:
“Well the doctors, they tend to think 'oh she's mental, she's this, she's that,
she's queer, she's crackers' and they want to pass you over and shove me
out of the room”
Qualifying patient ( AIP)
“I feel like I'm howling at the moon no matter how coherent, how rational
you know how considered my arguments and my explanations for events
are, that assumed level of incompetence undermines it because you're
given sub-status”.
Table 1
Key variables of the sample of qualifying patients interviewed.
Variable Description
Gender 47 men: 43 women
Age Age range= 15–75 years
Mean age= 39 years
Ethnicity White British: 70%
BAME: 28.5%
Other: 1.5%
Asylum seekers and refugees; 8%
Sexual orientation Heterosexual: 90%
LGBT: 7.5%
Other: 2.5%
Disability A: ‘mental health condition’ (including diagnoses of
bipolar, schizophrenia, depression, and eating
disorders or poor mental health associated with
anxiety or a pervasive lack of conﬁdence): 35%
Physical or sensory disability: 10.1%
Learning disability: 8%
Autistic spectrum condition: 5%
Multiple mental health and physical health problems:
2%
Not relevant: 22%
Length of contact with
mental health
services
Less than 3 months: 2.8%
3–6 months: 3.5%
6–12 months: 2.8%
1–3 years: 22.5%
3–5 years: 10%
More than 5 years: 57.5%
No response: 1.3%
Number of times
sectioned
Never: 1.3%
Once: 25%
Twice: 17.5%
Three times or more: 50%
No response: 5%
Access to IMHA 68% had accessed IMHA services
Service location In in-patient wards mainly acute inpatient adult wards
(AIP): 53%
Ssecure (including learning disability forensic services
and child and adolescent forensic mental health
services (CAMHS)): 40%
Compulsory Treatment Order (CTO) and using
community mental health services: 7%.
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IMHA partner ( AIP)
Instances of clinicians actively silencing participants and contra-
vening their rights were also referred to:
“I applied for a tribunal with the solicitors, he [the psychiatrist] called me
into his oﬃce and said to me 'don't go ahead with the tribunal'. When I
told him I was going to tribunal they only had about three or four days
and I think they were panicking so somehow they convinced me not to go
through the tribunal and I'm still kicking myself for that.”
BAME IMHA partner ( AIP)
It was evident that the dominant service discourse related to illness,
diagnosis, and compliance with the section and medication regimes:
“I'm not mentally ill, they keep changing the diagnosis, one minute they
say I'm personality disorder, then I'm schizophrenic, then I'm paranoid.
They keep changing the label now and then because I keep proving them
wrong.”
IMHA partner ( medium secure unit)
Participants felt reduced to a diagnosis or a risk assessment. A sense
of their personhood, an understanding of the context of their lives and
an alternative framing of their preferences and experience was often
absent.
5.3. Advocacy's contribution to addressing epistemic justice
Giving testimony to experience was seen as central to retaining a
sense of personhood and restoring hope. “The one thing that makes a
diﬀerence is knowing that your voice is being heard”. Whether or not
qualifying patients had accessed IMHA, there was an appreciation of
the role in enabling voice and mitigating the limitations on agency.
The diﬀerence having an IMHA made was described in terms of
having more of a voice and the experience of being listened to; that
someone understood their situation, what mattered to them, and re-
cognised the troubling nature of detention. All of this helped restore a
sense of personhood and greater control:
“I've got more of a voice through having an IMHA and because they know
all the rules and regulations, I can confront the mental health team and
say I know things, and the IMHA service will back me up."
IMHA partner ( AIP)
The presence of an advocate served to legitimise the participant's
voice and their presence altered the communicative exchange so that
health professionals were more respectful and listened more keenly,
increasing the likelihood that service users' views, preferences, and
choices would be heard.
Having an ally, particularly in the context of formal meetings, cre-
ated a sense of solidarity: ‘someone there to sit in and be on my side’:
“… if your advocate is there for you she's going to ﬁght for you. She came
in that day and she was speaking up for me and that was cool. I've got
learning diﬃculties but when I try to talk I always get frustrated about
words because I've only been in England for seven years. I speak English
really good but when it comes to hard questions I always sweat and I just
walk away.”
BAME IMHA partner (CAMHS)
Advocacy facilitated participants’ voices through three modes of
action: preparatory work, presence and positive action. Preparatory
meetings between the IMHA and their partner focussed on the key is-
sues the partner wanted to raise and the outcomes s/he was aiming for,
which were typically leave arrangements, changes to care and treat-
ment, returning home and wider concerns relating to housing, ﬁnances
and family relationships. Advocates regularly sourced information
about rights under the MH Act, medication and alternative treatments
or diagnosis resulting in participants feeling more empowered to par-
ticipate in discussions about their care and treatment. The presence of
the advocate in meetings with professionals served to enable the person
to feel more conﬁdent to be able to speak for themselves (self-ad-
vocate), and to ensure that concerns that mattered to them were raised
and acted upon:
“They provide help to people who need support to be able to speak up for
themselves, get their views across, get their wishes and feelings out and
shared with the professionals so that the person isn't just left to be
dragged along by the system. You feel as if you have no rights and no
control over anything that's going on in your life and the advocate can
make sure that you're not being forgotten or abused or denied your
rights.”
IMHA partner (AIP)
Advocates also represented people if they felt unable to have a voice
including those that were generally able to advocate for themselves. In
some instances, participants used the advocate tactically to manage the
communicative exchange with care professionals, including situations
where they wanted to challenge staﬀ but feared the consequences of
doing so directly. Participants valued the independent and conﬁdential
nature of the advocacy relationship, and appreciated the approachable
and non-judgemental approach of advocates as being ‘alongside’ them,
all critical to ensuring they had a voice:
“It gave me a voice, it gave me a platform in life. I don't have no family or
relatives or anything so the [IMHA] is there to get in touch with when I
need him, I call him and he oﬀers support.”
IMHA partner (AIP)
Trust in the advocate, often referred to as ‘good and honest’ people,
was related to the authentic representation of voice:
“ He [IMHA's name] was good at talking to the doctor, the way he
worded things and he'd always say what I wanted to say for me and he'd
always say it how I wanted it said, he'd never write it in his own way or
anything.”
IMHA partner ( AIP) (Newbigging et al., 2012)
It was also evident that the advocate's presence inﬂuenced the
power dynamic through exposing the communicative exchange and
professional practice to scrutiny:
“It (IMHA) opens it up, makes things transparent, changes the dynamic.
There is so much secrecy around mental health, around wards and it's
bullshit that staﬀ give oﬀ, staﬀ are the ones that enforce it and protect it
more than anybody else. The more they (IMHAs) are in here, rummaging
around and opening this place up, the more that light that comes on it
and the more open and transparent it becomes.”
IMHA partner ( AIP) (Newbigging et al., 2012)
Advocates acting as a ‘witness’ to communicative exchanges with
health professionals served to strengthen participants conﬁdence in
their personal interpretations of experience and could prevent rights
transgressions:
“I'm under, the Doctor, CPNs and the social workers from the Assertive
Outreach Team, and they have kind of built up a brick wall between me
and them, they're unhelpful, they're nasty, and they can be as awkward
as they possibly can be. So, it's nice to have the advocate to be there as a
witness to it all and see what they get up to, and put a stop to certain
events that they could get up to”
BAME IMHA partner ( CTO)
In promoting the voice of service users, participants highlighted
how IMHAs were, in some instances, treated poorly suggesting that
advocates’ epistemic authority was also constrained by the service
context:
“She supports me in every way but the hospital haven't gone along with
her, they haven't been open with her, they haven't told her the truth, they
haven't told her when my reviews are, she's rung up and she hasn't been
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able to get through and they've made it really hard for her.”
IMHA partner (AIP)
Some participants, while positive about the outcome of advocacy,
felt that contrary to enhancing their voice, the IMHA could serve to
reinforce the sense that they were not a credible witness to their own
experience:
“It just made me feel like I was considered unworthy, not worthwhile
enough and that you know obviously they would listen to her [IMHA] but
not to me and why would they listen to her and not to me when we were
both asking for exactly the same thing? But when she did get me the
leave, when she did help me to not be detained for a further six months I
did start to heal.”
IMHA partner( AIP)
Advocacy served to create a space for diﬀerent understandings and
some participants referred to an appreciation of their social and rela-
tional context by mental health professionals as a consequence. There
was less evidence that advocates were shifting professionals’ conception
of mental distress or that they had facilitated access to alternative
conceptual frameworks, for example, survivor literature and service
user groups, or that they were challenging assumptions on the basis of
race, gender or sexuality.
“I don't think she's [the advocate] there to challenge the decisions of the
hospital, she's there to support me which she did. I was literally trying to
kill myself but she's not there to do that, she's not there to be judgemental
or anything like that, she was just asking me what my problems were and
could she help me.”
IMHA partner (AIP)
Diﬀerent conceptual frameworks for mental distress were raised by
BAME participants in particular and in both the service user focus
groups and interviews there was a call for more peer advocacy:
“Peer support, peer support, peer advocacy because as service users you
do know there are things we will not tell anybody except say amongst
ourselves, you know because if you do say they will lock you up and
won't let you out.”
BAME service user ( focus group)
This raises questions of trust in statutory advocates and the sense
that some conversations are oﬀ- limits except with peers, notably per-
spectives that run counter to the prevailing discourse.
6. Discussion
In this article we explore a new approach to theorising advocacy
based on Fricker's evolving concept of epistemic injustice by grounding
it in empirical data. The service user accounts demonstrate how pro-
fessional behaviours, and structural and institutional barriers under-
pinned by legislative frameworks can conspire to negate epistemic
agency – the epistemic violence that Liegghio (2013) describes so
powerfully. Transactional forms of testimonial injustice were described
when the behaviour of an individual clinician was described as dis-
missive. Reference was also made to identity prejudice and the role of
the advocate as a witness to this, serving to vindicate the service user's
perspective, prevent rights transgressions, and above all maintain their
sense of personhood. Institutional and structural forms of epistemic
injustice were evident in the institutional regimes, particularly the
construction of ward rounds. Furthermore, the very essence of mental
health legislation, in privileging a biomedical discourse, negated the
social context and realities of people's lives, and in some instances
further compounded their diﬃculties.
Our ﬁndings indicate that advocacy can serve both to increase re-
cognition and legitimation of people detained under mental health law
as ‘epistemic agents’ and go some way to promoting testimonial justice
through strengthening voice and addressing prejudicial-credibility
deﬁcits. They also indicate that the advocacy role extends to acting as
an epistemic witness and ensure that epistemic agency is protected.
However, our ﬁndings suggest that advocacy is having little impact on
hermeneutical injustice in enabling people to reclaim or develop a
diﬀerent understanding of their experience. Two immediate reasons are
likely. First, the context of compulsion and experience of fearfulness
and disempowerment (Newbigging et al., 2015a; Stomski et al., 2017)
mean that advocates focus on securing rights and the immediate issues
rather than broader hermeneutic and ontological concerns. This po-
tentially engenders compliance with the dominant paradigm of mental
distress resulting in epistemic objectiﬁcation (LeBlanc and Kinsella,
2016) and a disconnection from their experience, which is likely to
impact negatively on recovery and future prospects. Second, the pur-
pose of IMHAs is prescribed in legislation and potentially limits their
scope, with some participants questioning how much IMHAs could
really achieve given the problematic nature of compulsion.
Alongside this, the introduction of statutory advocacy has increased
the professionalisation of advocacy through adversely impacting on
other forms of advocacy, which have strong connections with grassroots
activism (Newbigging et al., 2012, 2013; 2015a). Severing advocacy
from its foundations in lived experience, could explain why IMHA can
go some way to promoting testimonial justice but may fail to address
the more profound question of hermeneutical justice. For hermeneu-
tical justice, advocacy needs to enable people to access conceptual re-
sources to understand and frame their experience: for example in re-
lation to the contribution of trauma, and the relational and social
context for their current distress. This represents a fundamental chal-
lenge to the dominant biomedical discourse and has more far-reaching
implications than ensuring voice and representation, important as that
is. However, it is evident that detention and coercion under mental
health legislation has far reaching social and existential impacts justi-
fying a more penetrating understanding of experience of distress
(Norvoll and Pedersen, 2016) and explororation of alternative framings
of the experience. Indeed, questions of hermeneutical injustice are
particularly pressing for those that are most marginalised by the mental
health system, notably people from BAME communities, with con-
trasting interpretations of the experience of mental distress and pre-
ferences regarding support and advocacy models (Robinson et al., 2011;
Foley and Platzer, 2007; Newbigging et al., 2013; Newbigging et al.,
2012; 2015a).
Theorising advocacy in terms of epistemic injustice provides a
foundation for advocacy as a liberatory act and Code's (2006) distinc-
tion of it as voice-driven and knowledge-driven resonates with Fricker's
work. This conceptualisation not only provides a theoretical framework
for individual advocacy but also a basis for evaluating its impact. Ef-
fective voice-driven advocacy enables marginalised voices to be heard
and increases the propensity for self-advocacy. Eﬀective knowledge-
driven advocacy enables people to access diﬀerent conceptual re-
sources, particularly through peer relationships and connections with
user-led organisations, to make sense of their experience. A good ex-
ample of this is the Hearing Voices Network, which has reframed
hearing voices from illness to expressions of distress.
Adopting this theoretical framework of epistemic injustice raises
questions about the authenticity of voice, the impact of acute mental
distress on personal agency, and the appropriateness of advocacy in-
terventions in not only promoting epistemic justice for people experi-
encing mental distress but also in addressing the epistemic dis-
advantage of mental health professionals who do not have access to
lived experience and knowledge (Scrutton, 2017). This framework also
provides a way forward for evaluating advocacy and the identiﬁed
diﬃculties of disentangling the process of advocacy from its impact
(Ridley et al., 2018) to be clearly sighted on the type of impact.
It also raises fundamental questions about the purpose and future of
advocacy. Its sheer existence serves to mitigate the excesses of profes-
sional behaviours and institutional regimes in the context of mental
health legislation and access to IMHA needs to be widened (Newbigging
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et al., 2012, 2015b). It makes a signiﬁcant contribution to addressing
testimonial injustices, but its disconnection from its activist foundations
potentially mutes its impact in relation to hermeneutical injustice.
Thus, the future development of advocacy needs to pay heed to both
functions: realising voice and experiential knowledge.
The power disparities in mental health are clearly ingrained and
evidenced by an impasse in addressing the use of compulsion, contra-
vention of human rights and poor quality care in mental health. The
response to the UN call for an ‘international revolution’ in mental
health needs to foreground epistemic justice and methods for achieving
this, including advocacy, to progress a greater democratic sensibility
and social justice in mental health.
7. Limitations
The focus of the study was the quality of IMHA services in the UK
(Newbigging et al., 2012; 2015a), and other methods may have been
better suited to speciﬁc investigation of epistemic injustices in the
context of communicative exchange between service users, advocates,
and care professionals. Direct observation (Denzin, 2007) and con-
versation analysis (Drew et al., 2001) in particular are promising
methods to garner a rich and nuanced understanding of how epistemic
injustices play out in practice. Participants’ negative experiences may
have inﬂuenced their motivation to access IMHA and to participate in
this study, although the sampling method and attention to counter-
factual data was designed to mitigate this.
Article aim
To explore a new approach to theorising advocacy based on
Fricker's evolving concept of epistemic injustice and grounded in em-
pirical data from mental health service user accounts of statutory ad-
vocacy.
To identify the implications for promoting rights under mental
health legislation and achieving greater democracy in mental health
services.
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